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Abstract: Paleoclimate data show that climate sensitivity is ~3°C for doubled CO2, including only 
fast feedback processes. Equilibrium sensitivity, including slower surface albedo feedbacks, is 
~6°C for doubled CO2 for the range of climate states between glacial conditions and ice-free 
Antarctica. Decreasing CO2 was the main cause of a cooling trend that began 50 million years ago, 
the planet being nearly ice-free until CO2 fell to 450 ± 100 ppm; barring prompt policy changes, 
that critical level will be passed, in the opposite direction, within decades. If humanity wishes to 
preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed and to which life on Earth is 
adapted, paleoclimate evidence and ongoing climate change suggest that CO2 will need to be 
reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm, but likely less than that. The largest 
uncertainty in the target arises from possible changes of non-CO2 forcings. An initial 350 ppm 
CO2 target may be achievable by phasing out coal use except where CO2 is captured and adopting 
agricultural and forestry practices that sequester carbon. If the present overshoot of this target CO2 
is not brief, there is a possibility of seeding irreversible catastrophic effects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Human activities are altering Earth’s atmospheric composition. Concern about global 
warming due to long-lived human-made greenhouse gases (GHGs) led to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change [1] with the objective of stabilizing GHGs in the 
atmosphere at a level preventing “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.” 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC, 2] and others [3] used several 
“reasons for concern” to estimate that global warming of more than 2-3°C may be dangerous. 
The European Union adopted 2°C above pre-industrial global temperature as a goal to limit 
human-made warming [4]. Hansen et al. [5] argued for a limit of 1°C global warming (relative to 
2000, 1.7°C relative to pre-industrial time), aiming to avoid practically irreversible ice sheet and 
species loss. This 1°C limit, with nominal climate sensitivity of ¾°C per W/m2 and plausible 
control of other GHGs [6], implies maximum CO2 ~ 450 ppm [5]. 
 Our current analysis suggests that humanity must aim for an even lower level of GHGs. 
Paleoclimate data and ongoing global changes indicate that ‘slow’ climate feedback processes 
not included in most climate models, such as ice sheet disintegration, vegetation migration, and 
GHG release from soils, tundra or ocean sediments, may begin to come into play on time scales 
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as short as centuries or less [7]. Rapid on-going climate changes and realization that Earth is out 
of energy balance, implying that more warming is ‘in the pipeline’ [8], add urgency to 
investigation of the dangerous level of GHGs. 
 A probabilistic analysis [9] concluded that the long-term CO2 limit is in the range 300-500 
ppm for 25 percent risk tolerance, depending on climate sensitivity and non-CO2 forcings. 
Stabilizing atmospheric CO2 and climate requires that net CO2 emissions approach zero, because 
of the long lifetime of CO2 [10, 11].  
 We use paleoclimate data to show that long-term climate has high sensitivity to climate 
forcings and that the present global mean CO2, 385 ppm, is already in the dangerous zone.  
Despite rapid current CO2 growth, ~2 ppm/year, we show that it is conceivable to reduce CO2 
this century to less than the current amount, but only via prompt policy changes. 
 
1.1. Climate sensitivity 
   
 A global climate forcing, measured in W/m2 averaged over the planet, is an imposed 
perturbation of the planet’s energy balance.  Increase of solar irradiance (So) by 2% and 
doubling of atmospheric CO2 are each forcings of about 4 W/m2 [12].   
 Charney [13] defined an idealized climate sensitivity problem, asking how much global 
surface temperature would increase if atmospheric CO2 were instantly doubled, assuming that 
slowly-changing planetary surface conditions, such as ice sheets and forest cover, were fixed. 
Long-lived GHGs, except for the specified CO2 change, were also fixed, not responding to 
climate change. The Charney problem thus provides a measure of climate sensitivity including 
only the effect of ‘fast’ feedback processes, such as changes of water vapor, clouds and sea ice. 
 Classification of climate change mechanisms into fast and slow feedbacks is useful, even 
though time scales of these changes may overlap. We include as fast feedbacks aerosol changes, 
e.g., of desert dust and marine dimethylsulfide, that occur in response to climate change [7]. 
 Charney [13] used climate models to estimate fast-feedback doubled CO2 sensitivity of 3 ± 
1.5°C. Water vapor increase and sea ice decrease in response to global warming were both found 
to be strong positive feedbacks, amplifying the surface temperature response. Climate models in 
the current IPCC [2] assessment still agree with Charney’s estimate. 
 Climate models alone are unable to define climate sensitivity more precisely, because it is 
difficult to prove that models realistically incorporate all feedback processes. The Earth’s 
history, however, allows empirical inference of both fast feedback climate sensitivity and long-
term sensitivity to specified GHG change including the slow ice sheet feedback. 
 
2.  PLEISTOCENE EPOCH 
 
 Atmospheric composition and surface properties in the late Pleistocene are known well 
enough for accurate assessment of the fast-feedback (Charney) climate sensitivity. We first 
compare the pre-industrial Holocene with the last glacial maximum [LGM, 20 ky BP (before 
present)]. The planet was in energy balance in both periods within a small fraction of 1 W/m2, as 
shown by considering the contrary: an imbalance of 1 W/m2 maintained a few millennia would 
melt all ice on the planet or change ocean temperature an amount far outside measured variations 
[Table S1 of 8]. The approximate equilibrium characterizing most of Earth’s history is unlike the 
current situation, in which GHGs are rising at a rate much faster than the coupled climate system 
can respond. 
 Climate forcing in the LGM equilibrium state due to the ice age surface properties, i.e., 
increased ice area, different vegetation distribution, and continental shelf exposure, was -3.5 ± 1 
W/m2 [14] relative to the Holocene. Additional forcing due to reduced amounts of long-lived 
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GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O), including the indirect effects of CH4 on tropospheric ozone and 
stratospheric water vapor (Fig. S1) was -3 ± 0.5 W/m2. Global forcing due to slight changes in 
the Earth’s orbit is a negligible fraction of 1 W/m2 (Fig. S3). The total 6.5 W/m2 forcing and 
global surface temperature change of 5 ± 1°C relative to the Holocene [15, 16] yield an empirical 
sensitivity ~¾ ± ¼ °C per W/m2 forcing, i.e., a Charney sensitivity of 3 ± 1 °C for the 4 W/m2 
forcing of doubled CO2. This empirical fast-feedback climate sensitivity allows water vapor, 
clouds, aerosols, sea ice, and all other fast feedbacks that exist in the real world to respond 
naturally to global climate change. 
 Climate sensitivity varies as Earth becomes warmer or cooler. Toward colder extremes, as 
the area of sea ice grows, the planet approaches runaway snowball-Earth conditions, and at high 
temperatures it can approach a runaway greenhouse effect [12]. At its present temperature Earth 
is on a flat portion of its fast-feedback climate sensitivity curve (Fig. S2). Thus our empirical 
sensitivity, although strictly the mean fast-feedback sensitivity for climate states ranging from 
the ice age to the current interglacial period, is also today’s fast-feedback climate sensitivity. 
 
2.1. Verification 
 
 Our empirical fast-feedback climate sensitivity, derived by comparing conditions at two 
points in time, can be checked over the longer period of ice core data. Fig. (1a) shows CO2 and 
CH4 data from the Antarctic Vostok ice core [17, 18] and sea level based on Red Sea sediment 
cores [18]. Gases are from the same ice core and have a consistent time scale, but dating with 
respect to sea level may have errors up to several thousand years. 
 
Fig. (1). (a) CO2, 
CH4 [17] and sea 
level [19] for past 
425 ky.   
(b) Climate 
forcings due to 
changes of GHGs 
and ice sheet area, 
the latter inferred 
from sea level 
change.   
(c) Calculated 
global temperature 
change based on 
climate sensitivity 
of ¾°C per W/m2.  
Observations are 
Antarctic 
temperature 
change [18] 
divided by two. 
 
 We use the GHG and sea level data to calculate climate forcing by GHGs and surface albedo 
change as in prior calculations [7], but with two refinements. First, we specify the N2O climate 
forcing as 12 percent of the sum of the CO2 and CH4 forcings, rather than the 15 percent 
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estimated earlier [7]  Because N2O data are not available for the entire record, and its forcing is 
small and highly correlated with CO2 and CH4, we take the GHG effective forcing as 
 
                                     Fe (GHGs) = 1.12 [Fa(CO2) + 1.4 Fa(CH4)],                                       (1) 
 
using published formulae for Fa of each gas [20]. The factor 1.4 accounts for the higher efficacy 
of CH4 relative to CO2, which is due mainly to the indirect effect of CH4 on tropospheric ozone 
and stratospheric water vapor [12].  The resulting GHG forcing between the LGM and late 
Holocene is 3 W/m2, apportioned as 75% CO2, 14% CH4 and 11% N2O. 
 The second refinement in our calculations is to surface albedo.  Based on models of ice sheet 
shape, we take the horizontal area of the ice sheet as proportional to the 4/5 power of volume.  
Fig. (S4) compares our present albedo forcing with prior use [7] of exponent 2/3, showing that 
this choice and division of the ice into multiple ice sheets has only a minor effect. 
 Multiplying the sum of GHG and surface albedo forcings by climate sensitivity ¾°C per 
W/m2 yields the blue curve in Fig. (1c). Vostok temperature change [17] divided by two (red 
curve) is used to crudely estimate global temperature change, as typical glacial-interglacial 
global annual-mean temperature change is ~5°C and is associated with ~10°C change on 
Antarctica [21].  Fig. (1c) shows that fast-feedback climate sensitivity ¾°C per W/m2 (3°C for 
doubled CO2) is a good approximation for the entire period. 
 
2.2. Slow feedbacks 
 
   Let us consider climate change averaged over a few thousand years – long enough to assure 
energy balance and minimize effects of ocean thermal response time and climate change 
leads/lags between hemispheres [22].  At such temporal resolution the temperature variations in 
Fig. (1) are global, with high latitude amplification, being present in polar ice cores and sea 
surface temperature derived from ocean sediment cores (Fig. S5).  
 GHG and surface albedo changes are mechanisms causing the large global climate changes 
in Fig. (1), but they do not initiate these climate swings.  Instead changes of GHGs and sea level 
(a measure of ice sheet size) lag temperature change by several hundred years [6, 7, 23, 24]. 
 GHG and surface albedo changes are positive climate feedbacks. Major glacial-interglacial 
climate swings are instigated by slow changes of Earth’s orbit, especially the tilt of Earth’s spin-
axis relative to the orbital plane and the precession of the equinoxes that influences the intensity 
of summer insolation [25, 26]. Global radiative forcing due to orbital changes is small, but ice 
sheet size is affected by changes of geographical and seasonal insolation (e.g., ice melts at both 
poles when the spin-axis tilt increases, and ice melts at one pole when perihelion, the closest 
approach to the sun, occurs in late spring [7]. Also a warming climate causes net release of 
GHGs. The most effective GHG feedback is release of CO2 by the ocean, due partly to 
temperature dependence of CO2 solubility but mostly to increased ocean mixing in a warmer 
climate, which acts to flush out deep ocean CO2 and alters ocean biological productivity [27]. 
 GHG and surface albedo feedbacks respond and contribute to temperature change caused by 
any climate forcing, natural or human-made, given sufficient time. The GHG feedback is nearly 
linear in global temperature during the late Pleistocene [Fig. (7) of 6, 28]. Surface albedo 
feedback increases as Earth becomes colder and the area of ice increases. Climate sensitivity on 
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Fig. (2). Global temperature (left scale) and GHG forcing (right scale) due to CO2, CH4 and N2O from the 
Vostok ice core [17, 18]. Time scale is expanded for the industrial era. Ratio of temperature and forcing 
scales is 1.5°C per W/m2, i.e., the temperature scale gives the expected equilibrium response to GHG 
change including (slow feedback) surface albedo change. Modern forcings include human-made aerosols, 
volcanic aerosols and solar irradiance [5]. GHG forcing zero point is the mean for 10-8 ky BP (Fig. S6). 
Zero point of modern temperature and net climate forcing was set at 1850 [5], but this is also the zero 
point for 10-8 ky BP, as shown by the absence of a trend in Fig. (S6) and by the discussion of that figure.  
Pleistocene time scales includes slow feedbacks, and is larger than the Charney sensitivity, 
because the dominant slow feedbacks are positive. Other feedbacks, e.g., the negative feedback 
of increased weathering as CO2 increases, become important on longer geologic time scales. 
 Paleoclimate data permit evaluation of long-term sensitivity to specified GHG change. We 
assume only that, to first order, the area of ice is a function of global temperature. Plotting GHG 
forcing [7] from ice core data [18] against temperature shows that global climate sensitivity 
including the slow surface albedo feedback is 1.5°C per W/m2 or 6°C for doubled CO2 (Fig. 2), 
twice as large as the Charney fast-feedback sensitivity.  Note that we assume the area of ice and 
snow on the planet to be predominately dependent on global temperature, but some changes of 
regional ice sheet properties occur as part of the Earth orbital climate forcing (see Appendix). 
 This equilibrium sensitivity of 6°C for doubled CO2 is valid for specified GHG amount, as in 
studies that employ emission scenarios and coupled carbon cycle/climate models to determine 
GHG amount.  If GHGs are included as a feedback (with say solar irradiance as forcing) 
sensitivity is still larger on Pleistocene time scales (see Appendix), but the sensitivity may be 
reduced by negative feedbacks on geologic time scales [29, 30].  The 6°C sensitivity reduces to 
3°C when the planet has become warm enough to lose its ice sheets. 
 This long-term climate sensitivity is relevant to GHGs that remain airborne for centuries-to-
millennia. The human-caused atmospheric GHG increase will decline slowly if anthropogenic 
emissions from fossil fuel burning decrease enough, as we illustrate below using a simplified 
carbon cycle model.  On the other hand, if the globe warms much further, carbon cycle models 
[2] and empirical data [6, 28] reveal a positive GHG feedback on century-millennia time scales. 
This amplification of GHG amount is moderate if warming is kept within the range of recent 
interglacial periods [6], but larger warming would risk greater release of CH4 and CO2 from 
methane hydrates in tundra and ocean sediments [29].  On still longer, geological, time scales 
weathering of rocks causes a negative feedback on atmospheric CO2 amount [30], as discussed in 
section 3, but this feedback is too slow to alleviate climate change of concern to humanity. 
 
2.3 Time scales 
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 How long does it take to reach equilibrium temperature with specified GHG change? 
Response is slowed by ocean thermal inertia and the time needed for ice sheets to disintegrate. 
 Ocean-caused delay is estimated in Fig. (S7) using a coupled atmosphere-ocean model. One-
third of the response occurs in the first few years, in part because of rapid response over land, 
one-half in ~25 years, three-quarters in 250 years, and nearly full response in a millennium. The 
ocean-caused delay is a strong (quadratic) function of climate sensitivity and it depends on the 
rate of mixing of surface water and deep water [31], as discussed in the Appendix.  
 Ice sheet response time is often assumed to be several millennia, based on the broad sweep of 
paleo sea level change (Fig.1a) and primitive ice sheet models designed to capture that change.  
However, this long time scale may reflect the slowly changing orbital forcing, rather than 
inherent inertia, as there is no discernable lag between maximum ice sheet melt rate and local 
insolation that favors melt [7].  Paleo sea level data with high time resolution reveal frequent 
‘suborbital’ sea level changes at rates of 1 m/century or more [32-34]. 
 Present-day observations of Greenland and Antarctica show increasing surface melt [35], loss 
of buttressing ice shelves [36], accelerating ice streams [37], and increasing overall mass loss 
[38].  These rapid changes do not occur in existing ice sheet models, which are missing critical 
physics of ice sheet disintegration [39]. Sea level changes of several meters per century occur in 
the paleoclimate record [32, 33], in response to forcings slower and weaker than the present 
human-made forcing. It seems likely that large ice sheet response will occur within centuries, if 
human-made forcings continue to increase. Once ice sheet disintegration is underway, decadal 
changes of sea level may be substantial. 
 
2.4. Warming “in the pipeline” 
 
 The expanded time scale for the industrial era (Fig. 2) reveals a growing gap between actual 
global temperature (purple curve) and equilibrium (long-term) temperature response based on the 
net estimated climate forcing (black curve). Ocean and ice sheet response times together account 
for this gap, which is now 2.0°C. 
 The forcing in Fig. (2) (black curve, Fe scale), when used to drive a global climate model [5], 
yields global temperature change that agrees closely [Fig. (3) in 5] with observations (purple 
curve, Fig. 2). That climate model, which includes only fast feedbacks, has additional warming 
of ~0.6°C in the pipeline today because of ocean thermal inertia [5, 8]. 
 The remaining gap between equilibrium temperature for current atmospheric composition 
and actual global temperature is ~1.4°C. This further 1.4°C warming still to come is due to the 
slow surface albedo feedback, specifically ice sheet disintegration and vegetation change. 
 One may ask whether the climate system, as the Earth warms from its present ‘interglacial’ 
state, still has the capacity to supply slow feedbacks that double the fast-feedback sensitivity.  
This issue can be addressed by considering longer time scales including periods with no ice. 
 
3.  CENOZOIC ERA 
 
 Pleistocene atmospheric CO2 variations occur as a climate feedback, as carbon is exchanged 
among surface reservoirs: the ocean, atmosphere, soils and biosphere.  The most effective 
feedback is increase of atmospheric CO2 as climate warms, the CO2 transfer being mainly from 
ocean to atmosphere [27, 28].  On longer time scales the total amount of CO2 in the surface 
reservoirs varies due to exchange of carbon with the solid earth.  CO2 thus becomes a primary 
agent of long-term climate change, leaving orbital effects as ‘noise’ on larger climate swings. 
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Fig. (3).  Global deep 
ocean (a) δ18O [26] 
and (b) temperature.  
Black curve is 5-point 
running mean of δ18O 
original temporal 
resolution, while red 
and blue curves have 
500 ky resolution. 
 
 
 The Cenozoic era, the past 65.5 My, provides a valuable complement to the Pleistocene for 
exploring climate sensitivity. Cenozoic data on climate and atmospheric composition are not as 
precise, but larger climate variations occur, including an ice-free planet, thus putting glacial-
interglacial changes in a wider perspective. 
 Oxygen isotopic composition of benthic (deep ocean dwelling) foraminifera shells in a global 
compilation of ocean sediment cores [26] provides a starting point for analyzing Cenozoic 
climate change (Fig. 3a). At times with negligible ice sheets, oxygen isotope change, δ18O, 
provides a direct measure of deep ocean temperature (Tdo). Thus Tdo (°C) ~ -4 δ18O + 12 between 
65.5 and 35 My BP. 
 Rapid increase of δ18O at about 34 My is associated with glaciation of Antarctica [26, 40] 
and global cooling, as evidenced by data from North America [41] and Asia [42]. From then 
until the present, 18O in deep ocean foraminifera is affected by both ice volume and Tdo, lighter 
16O evaporating preferentially from the ocean and accumulating in ice sheets. Between 35 My 
and the last ice age (20 ky) the change of δ18O was ~ 3‰, change of Tdo was ~ 6°C (from +5 to -
1°C) and ice volume change ~ 180 msl (meters of sea level). Given that a 1.5‰ change of δ18O 
is associated with a 6°C Tdo change, we assign the remaining δ18O change to ice volume linearly 
at the rate 60 msl per mil δ18O change (thus 180 msl for δ18O between 1.75 and 4.75). Equal 
division of δ18O between temperature and sea level yields sea level change in the late Pleistocene 
in reasonable accord with available sea level data (Fig. S8). Subtracting the ice volume portion 
of δ18O yields deep ocean temperature Tdo (°C) = -2 (δ18O -4.25‰) after 35 My, as in Fig. (3b). 
 The large (~14°C) Cenozoic temperature change between 50 My and the ice age at 20 ky 
must have been forced by changes of atmospheric composition. Alternative drives could come 
from outside (solar irradiance) or the Earth’s surface (continental locations). But solar brightness 
increased ~0.4% in the Cenozoic [43], a linear forcing change of only +1 W/m2 and of the wrong 
sign to contribute to the cooling trend. Climate forcing due to continental locations was < 1 
W/m2, because continents 65 My ago were already close to present latitudes (Fig. S9). Opening 
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or closing of oceanic gateways might affect the timing of glaciation, but it would not provide the 
climate forcing needed for global cooling. 
 CO2 concentration, in contrast, varied from ~180 ppm in glacial times to 1500 ± 500 ppm in 
the early Cenozoic [44]. This change is a forcing of more than 10 W/m2 (Table 1 in [16]), an 
order of magnitude larger than other known forcings. CH4 and N2O, positively correlated with 
CO2 and global temperature in the period with accurate data (ice cores), likely increase the total 
GHG forcing, but their forcings are much smaller than that of CO2 [45, 46]. 
  
3.1. Cenozoic carbon cycle   
 
 Solid Earth sources and sinks of CO2 are not, in general, balanced at any given time [30, 47]. 
CO2 is removed from surface reservoirs by: (1) chemical weathering of rocks with deposition of 
carbonates on the ocean floor, and (2) burial of organic matter; weathering is the dominant 
process [30].  CO2 returns primarily via metamorphism and volcanic outgassing at locations 
where carbonate-rich oceanic crust is being subducted beneath moving continental plates. 
 Outgassing and burial of CO2 are each typically 1012-1013 mol C/year [30, 47-48]. At times 
of unusual plate tectonic activity, such as rapid subduction of carbon-rich ocean crust or strong 
orogeny, the imbalance between outgassing and burial can be a significant fraction of the one-
way carbon flux. Although negative feedbacks in the geochemical carbon cycle reduce the rate 
of surface reservoir perturbation [49], a net imbalance ~1012 mol C/year can be maintained over 
thousands of years.  Such an imbalance, if confined to the atmosphere, would be ~0.005 
ppm/year, but as CO2 is distributed among surface reservoirs, this is only ~0.0001 ppm/year. 
This rate is negligible compared to the present human-made atmospheric CO2 increase of ~2 
ppm/year, yet over a million years such a crustal imbalance alters atmospheric CO2 by 100 ppm. 
 Between 60 and 50 My ago India moved north rapidly, 18-20 cm/year [50], through a region 
that long had been a depocenter for carbonate and organic sediments. Subduction of carbon-rich 
crust was surely a large source of CO2 outgassing and a prime cause of global warming, which 
peaked 50 My ago (Fig. 3b) with the Indo-Asian collision. CO2 must have then decreased due to 
a reduced subduction source and enhanced weathering with uplift of the Himalayas/Tibetan 
Plateau [51]. Since then, the Indian and Atlantic Oceans have been major depocenters for carbon, 
but subduction of carbon-rich crust has been limited mainly to small regions near Indonesia and 
Central America [47]. 
 Thus atmospheric CO2 declined following the Indo-Asian collision [44] and climate cooled 
(Fig. 3b) leading to Antarctic glaciation by ~34 My. Antarctica has been more or less glaciated 
ever since. The rate of CO2 drawdown declines as atmospheric CO2 decreases due to negative 
feedbacks, including the effect of declining atmospheric temperature and plant growth rates on 
weathering [30]. These negative feedbacks tend to create a balance between crustal outgassing 
and drawdown of CO2, which have been equal within 1-2 percent over the past 700 ky [52]. 
Large fluctuations in the size of the Antarctic ice sheet have occurred in the past 34 My, possibly 
related to temporal variations of plate tectonics [53] and outgassing rates. The relatively constant 
atmospheric CO2 amount of the past 20 My (Fig. S10) implies a near balance of outgassing and 
weathering rates over that period. 
 Knowledge of Cenozoic CO2 is limited to imprecise proxy measures except for recent ice 
core data. There are discrepancies among different proxy measures, and even between different 
investigators using the same proxy method, as discussed in conjunction with Fig. (S10). 
Nevertheless, the proxy data indicate that CO2 was of the order of 1000 ppm in the early 
Cenozoic but <500 ppm in the last 20 My [2, 44]. 
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Fig. (4).  (a) Total climate forcing, 
(b) solar and surface albedo forcings, 
and (c) GHG forcing in the Cenozoic, 
based on Tdo history of Fig. (3b) and 
assumed fast-feedback climate 
sensitivity ¾°C per W/m2.  Ratio of 
Ts change and Tdo change is assumed 
to be near unity in the minimal ice 
world between 65 and 35 My, but the 
gray area allows for 50% uncertainty 
in the ratio. In the later era with large 
ice sheets we take ∆Ts/∆Tdo = 1.5, in 
accord with Pleistocene data. 
 
 
3.2. Cenozoic forcing and CO2 
 
 The entire Cenozoic climate forcing history (Fig. 4a) is implied by the temperature 
reconstruction (Fig. 3b), assuming a fast-feedback sensitivity of ¾°C per W/m2.  Subtracting the  
solar and surface albedo forcings (Fig. 4b), the latter from Eq. S2 with ice sheet area vs. time 
from δ18O, we obtain the GHG forcing history (Fig. 4c). 
 We hinge our calculations at 35 My for several reasons. Between 65 and 35 My ago there 
was little ice on the planet, so climate sensitivity is defined mainly by fast feedbacks. Second, we  
want to estimate the CO2 amount that precipitated Antarctic glaciation. Finally, the relation 
between global surface air temperature change (∆Ts) and deep ocean temperature change (∆Tdo) 
differs for ice-free and glaciated worlds. 
   Climate models show that global temperature change is tied closely to ocean temperature 
change [54]. Deep ocean temperature is a function of high latitude ocean surface temperature, 
which tends to be amplified relative to global mean ocean surface temperature. However, land 
temperature change exceeds that of the ocean, with an effect on global temperature that tends to 
offset the latitudinal variation of ocean temperature. Thus in the ice-free world (65-35 My) we 
take ∆Ts ~ ∆Tdo with generous (50%) uncertainty. In the glaciated world ∆Tdo is limited by the 
freezing point in the deep ocean.  ∆Ts between the last ice age (20 ky) and the present interglacial 
period (~5°C) was ~1.5 times larger than ∆Tdo. In Fig. (S5) we show that this relationship fits 
well throughout the period of ice core data. 
 10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (5). (a) Simulated CO2 
amounts in the Cenozoic for three 
choices of CO2 amount at 35 My 
(temporal resolution of black and 
colored curves as in Fig. (3); blue 
region: multiple CO2 proxy data, 
discussed with Fig. S10; gray 
region allows 50 percent 
uncertainty in ratio of global 
surface and deep ocean 
temperatures).  (b)  Expanded 
view of late Pleistocene, 
including precise ice core CO2 
measurements (black curve). 
 
 
 If we specify CO2 at 35 My, the GHG forcing defines CO2 at other times, assuming CO2 
provides 75% of the GHG forcing, as in the late Pleistocene.  CO2 ~450 ppm at 35 My keeps 
CO2 in the range of early Cenozoic proxies (Fig. 5a) and yields a good fit to the amplitude and 
mean CO2 amount in the late Pleistocene (Fig. 5b).  A CO2 threshold for Antarctic glaciation of 
~500 ppm was previously inferred from proxy CO2 data and a carbon cycle model [55]. 
 Individual CO2 proxies (Fig. S10) clarify limitations due to scatter among the measurements.  
Low CO2 of some early Cenozoic proxies, if valid, would suggest higher climate sensitivity.  
However, in general the sensitivities inferred from the Cenozoic and Phanerozoic [56, 57, 58]  
agree well with our analysis, if we account for the ways in which sensitivity is defined and the 
periods emphasized in each empirical derivation (Table S1). 
 Our CO2 estimate of ~450 ppm at 35 My (Fig. 5) serves as a prediction to compare with new 
data on CO2 amount. Model uncertainties (Fig. S10) include possible changes of non-CO2 GHGs 
and the relation of ∆Ts to ∆Tdo. The model fails to account for cooling in the past 15 My if CO2  
increased, as several proxies suggest (Fig. S10). Changing ocean currents, such as the closing of 
the Isthmus of Panama, may have contributed to climate evolution, but models find little effect 
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on temperature [59].  Non-CO2 GHGs also could have played a role, because little forcing would 
have been needed to cause cooling due to the magnitude of late Cenozoic albedo feedback. 
 
3.3. Implication 
 
 We infer from Cenozoic data that CO2 was the dominant Cenozoic forcing, that CO2 was 
~450 ± 100 ppm when Antarctica glaciated, and that glaciation is reversible. Together these 
inferences have profound implications.  
 Consider three points marked in Fig. (4): point A at 35 My, just before Antarctica glaciated; 
point B at recent interglacial periods; point C at the depth of recent ice ages. Point B is about half 
way between A and C in global temperature (Fig. 3b) and climate forcings (Fig. 4). The GHG 
forcing from the deepest recent ice age to current interglacial warmth is ~3.5 W/m2.  Additional 
4 W/m2 forcing carries the planet, at equilibrium, to the ice-free state.  Thus equilibrium climate 
sensitivity to GHG change, including the surface albedo change as a slow feedback, is almost as 
large between today and an ice-free world as between today and the ice ages. 
 The implication is that global climate sensitivity of 3°C for doubled CO2, although valid for 
the idealized Charney definition of climate sensitivity, is a considerable understatement of 
expected equilibrium global warming in response to imposed doubled CO2. Additional warming, 
due to slow climate feedbacks including loss of ice and spread of flora over the vast high-latitude 
land area in the Northern Hemisphere, approximately doubles equilibrium climate sensitivity. 
 Equilibrium sensitivity 6°C for doubled CO2 is relevant to the case in which GHG changes 
are specified.  That is appropriate to the anthropogenic case, provided the GHG amounts are 
estimated from carbon cycle models including climate feedbacks such as methane release from 
tundra and ocean sediments.  The equilibrium sensitivity is even higher if the GHG feedback is 
included as part of the climate response, as is appropriate for analysis of the climate response to 
Earth orbital perturbations.  The very high sensitivity with both albedo and GHG slow feedbacks 
included accounts for the huge magnitude of glacial-interglacial fluctuations in the Pleistocene 
(Fig. 3) in response to small forcings (section 3 of Appendix).  
 Equilibrium climate response would not be reached in decades or even in a century, because 
surface warming is slowed by the inertia of the ocean (Fig. S7) and ice sheets.  However, Earth’s 
history suggests that positive feedbacks, especially surface albedo changes, can spur rapid global 
warmings, including sea level rise as fast as several meters per century [7].  Thus if humans push 
the climate system sufficiently far into disequilibrium, positive climate feedbacks may set in 
motion dramatic climate change and climate impacts that cannot be controlled. 
 
4.  ANTHROPOCENE ERA 
 
 Human-made global climate forcings now prevail over natural forcings (Fig. 2). Earth may 
have entered the Anthropocene era [60, 61] 6-8 ky ago [62], but the net human-made forcing was 
small, perhaps slightly negative [7], prior to the industrial era. GHG forcing overwhelmed 
natural and negative human-made forcings only in the past quarter century (Fig. 2). 
 Human-made climate change is delayed by ocean (Fig. S7) and ice sheet response times.  
Warming ‘in the pipeline’, mostly attributable to slow feedbacks, is now about 2°C (Fig. 2). No 
additional forcing is required to raise global temperature to at least the level of the Pliocene, 2-3 
million years ago, a degree of warming that would surely yield ‘dangerous’ climate impacts [5]. 
 
4.1. Tipping points   
 
 Realization that today’s climate is far out of equilibrium with current climate forcings raises 
the specter of ‘tipping points’, the concept that climate can reach a point where, without 
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additional forcing, rapid changes proceed practically out of our control [2, 7, 63, 64]. Arctic sea 
ice and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet are examples of potential tipping points.  Arctic sea ice loss 
is magnified by the positive feedback of increased absorption of sunlight as global warming 
initiates sea ice retreat [65]. West Antarctic ice loss can be accelerated by several feedbacks, 
once ice loss is substantial [39]. 
 We define: (1) the tipping level, the global climate forcing that, if long maintained, gives rise 
to a specific consequence, and (2) the point of no return, a climate state beyond which the 
consequence is inevitable, even if climate forcings are reduced. A point of no return can be 
avoided, even if the tipping level is temporarily exceeded. Ocean and ice sheet inertia permit 
overshoot, provided the climate forcing is returned below the tipping level before initiating 
irreversible dynamic change. 
 Points of no return are inherently difficult to define, because the dynamical problems are 
nonlinear. Existing models are more lethargic than the real world for phenomena now unfolding, 
including changes of sea ice [65], ice streams [66], ice shelves [36], and expansion of the 
subtropics [67, 68]. 
 The tipping level is easier to assess, because the paleoclimate quasi-equilibrium response to 
known climate forcing is relevant. The tipping level is a measure of the long-term climate 
forcing that humanity must aim to stay beneath to avoid large climate impacts. The tipping level 
does not define the magnitude or period of tolerable overshoot. However, if overshoot is in place 
for centuries, the thermal perturbation will so penetrate the ocean [10] that recovery without 
dramatic effects, such as ice sheet disintegration, becomes unlikely. 
  
4.2. Target CO2 
 
 Combined, GHGs other than CO2 cause climate forcing comparable to that of CO2 [2, 6], but 
growth of non-CO2 GHGs is falling below IPCC [2] scenarios.  Thus total GHG climate forcing 
change is now determined mainly by CO2 [69]. Coincidentally, CO2 forcing is similar to the net 
human-made forcing, because non-CO2 GHGs tend to offset negative aerosol forcing [2, 5]. 
 Thus we take future CO2 change as approximating the net human-made forcing change, with 
two caveats. First, special effort to reduce non-CO2 GHGs could alleviate the CO2 requirement, 
allowing up to about +25 ppm CO2 for the same climate effect, while resurgent growth of non-
CO2 GHGs could reduce allowed CO2 a similar amount [6]. Second, reduction of human-made 
aerosols, which have a net cooling effect, could force stricter GHG requirements. However, an 
emphasis on reducing black soot could largely off-set reductions of high albedo aerosols [20]. 
 Our estimated history of CO2 through the Cenozoic Era provides a sobering perspective for 
assessing an appropriate target for future CO2 levels.  A CO2 amount of order 450 ppm or larger, 
if long maintained, would push Earth toward the ice-free state.  Although ocean and ice sheet 
inertia limit the rate of climate change, such a CO2 level likely would cause the passing of 
climate tipping points and initiate dynamic responses that could be out of humanity’s control.   
 The climate system, because of its inertia, has not yet fully responded to the recent increase 
of human-made climate forcings [5].  Yet climate impacts are already occurring that allow us to 
make an initial estimate for a target atmospheric CO2 level.  No doubt the target will need to be 
adjusted as climate data and knowledge improve, but the urgency and difficulty of reducing the 
human-made forcing will be less, and more likely manageable, if excess forcing is limited soon. 
 Civilization is adapted to climate zones of the Holocene. Theory and models indicate that 
subtropical regions expand poleward with global warming [2, 67]. Data reveal a 4-degree 
latitudinal shift already [68], larger than model predictions, yielding increased aridity in southern 
United States [70, 71], the Mediterranean region, Australia and parts of Africa. Impacts of this 
climate shift [72] support the conclusion that 385 ppm CO2 is already deleterious. 
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 Alpine glaciers are in near-global retreat [72, 73]. After a one-time added flush of fresh 
water, glacier demise will yield summers and autumns of frequently dry rivers, including rivers 
originating in the Himalayas, Andes and Rocky Mountains that now supply water to hundreds of 
millions of people. Present glacier retreat, and warming in the pipeline, indicate that 385 ppm 
CO2 is already a threat. 
 Equilibrium sea level rise for today’s 385 ppm CO2 is at least several meters, judging from 
paleoclimate history [19, 32-34]. Accelerating mass losses from Greenland [74] and West 
Antarctica [75] heighten concerns about ice sheet stability. An initial CO2 target of 350 ppm, to 
be reassessed as effects on ice sheet mass balance are observed, is suggested. 
 Stabilization of Arctic sea ice cover requires, to first approximation, restoration of planetary 
energy balance. Climate models driven by known forcings yield a present planetary energy 
imbalance of +0.5-1 W/m2 [5].  Observed heat increase in the upper 700 m of the ocean [76] 
confirms the planetary energy imbalance, but observations of the entire ocean are needed for 
quantification. CO2 amount must be reduced to 325-355 ppm to increase outgoing flux 0.5-1 
W/m2, if other forcings are unchanged.  A further imbalance reduction, and thus CO2 ~300-325 
ppm, may be needed to restore sea ice to its area of 25 years ago. 
 Coral reefs are suffering from multiple stresses, with ocean acidification and ocean warming 
principal among them [77]. Given additional warming ‘in-the-pipeline’, 385 ppm CO2 is already 
deleterious. A 300-350 ppm CO2 target would significantly relieve both of these stresses. 
 
4.3. CO2 scenarios 
 
 A large fraction of fossil fuel CO2 emissions stays in the air a long time, one-quarter 
remaining airborne for several centuries [11, 78, 79]. Thus moderate delay of fossil fuel use will 
not appreciably reduce long-term human-made climate change. Preservation of a climate 
resembling that to which humanity is accustomed, the climate of the Holocene, requires that 
most remaining fossil fuel carbon is never emitted to the atmosphere. 
 Coal is the largest reservoir of conventional fossil fuels (Fig. S12), exceeding combined 
reserves of oil and gas [2, 79]. The only realistic way to sharply curtail CO2 emissions is to phase 
out coal use except where CO2 is captured and sequestered. 
 Phase-out of coal emissions by 2030 (Fig. 6) keeps maximum CO2 close to 400 ppm, 
depending on oil and gas reserves and reserve growth. IPCC reserves assume that half of readily 
extractable oil has already been used (Figs. 6, S12). EIA [80] estimates (Fig. S12) have larger 
reserves and reserve growth.  Even if EIA estimates are accurate, the IPCC case remains valid if  
the most difficult to extract oil and gas is left in the ground, via a rising price on carbon 
emissions that discourages remote exploration and environmental regulations that place some  
areas off-limit. If IPCC gas reserves (Fig. S12) are underestimated, the IPCC case in Fig. (6) 
remains valid if the additional gas reserves are used at facilities where CO2 is captured. 
 However, even with phase-out of coal emissions and assuming IPCC oil and gas reserves, 
CO2 would remain above 350 ppm for more than two centuries. Ongoing Arctic and ice sheet 
changes, examples of rapid paleoclimate change, and other criteria cited above all drive us to 
consider scenarios that bring CO2 more rapidly back to 350 ppm or less. 
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 Fig. (6). (a) Fossil fuel CO2 emissions with coal phase-out by 2030 based on IPCC [2] and EIA [80] 
estimated fossil fuel reserves.  (b) Resulting atmospheric CO2 based on use of a dynamic-sink pulse 
response function representation of the Bern carbon cycle model [78, 79]. 
 
4.4. Policy relevance 
 
 Desire to reduce airborne CO2 raises the question of whether CO2 could be drawn from the 
air artificially. There are no large-scale technologies for CO2 air capture now, but with strong 
research and development support and industrial-scale pilot projects sustained over decades it 
may be possible to achieve costs ~$200/tC [81] or perhaps less [82].  At $200/tC, the cost of 
removing 50 ppm of CO2 is ~$20 trillion. 
 Improved agricultural and forestry practices offer a more natural way to draw down CO2. 
Deforestation contributed a net emission of 60±30 ppm over the past few hundred years, of  
which ~20 ppm CO2 remains in the air today [2, 83, Figs. (S12), (S14)]. Reforestation could 
absorb a substantial fraction of the 60±30 ppm net deforestation emission. 
 Carbon sequestration in soil also has significant potential.  Biochar, produced in pyrolysis of 
residues from crops, forestry, and animal wastes, can be used to restore soil fertility while storing 
carbon for centuries to millennia [84]. Biochar helps soil retain nutrients and fertilizers, reducing 
emissions of GHGs such as N2O [85]. Replacing slash-and-burn agriculture with slash-and-char 
and use of agricultural and forestry wastes for biochar production could provide a CO2 
drawdown of ~8 ppm or more in half a century [85]. 
 In the Appendix we define a forest/soil drawdown scenario that reaches 50 ppm by 2150 
(Fig. 6b). This scenario returns CO2 below 350 ppm late this century, after about 100 years 
above that level. 
 More rapid drawdown could be provided by CO2 capture at power plants fueled by gas and 
biofuels [86]. Low-input high-diversity biofuels grown on degraded or marginal lands, with 
associated biochar production, could accelerate CO2 drawdown, but the nature of a biofuel 
approach must be carefully designed [85, 87-89]. 
 A rising price on carbon emissions and payment for carbon sequestration is surely needed to 
make drawdown of airborne CO2 a reality.  A 50 ppm drawdown via agricultural and forestry 
practices seems plausible. But if most of the CO2 in coal is put into the air, no such “natural” 
drawdown of CO2 to 350 ppm is feasible. Indeed, if the world continues on a business-as-usual 
path for even another decade without initiating phase-out of unconstrained coal use, prospects for 
avoiding a dangerously large, extended overshoot of the 350 ppm level will be dim. 
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 Fig. (7). (a) Seasonal-mean global and low-latitude surface temperature anomalies relative to 1951-
1980, an update of [92], (b) global-ocean-mean sea surface temperature anomaly at monthly resolution.  
The Nino 3.4 Index, the temperature anomaly (12-month running mean) in a small part of the tropical 
Pacific Ocean [93], is a measure of ENSO, a basin-wide sloshing of the tropical Pacific Ocean [94].  
Green triangles show major volcanic eruptions. 
 
4.5. Caveats: climate variability, climate models, and uncertainties 
 
 Climate has great variability, much of which is unforced and unpredictable [2, 90].  This fact 
raises a practical issue: what is the chance that climate variations, e.g., a temporary cooling trend, 
will affect public recognition of climate change, making it difficult to implement mitigation 
policies?  Also what are the greatest uncertainties in the expectation of a continued global 
warming trend?  And what are the impacts of climate model limitations, given the inability of 
models to realistically simulate many aspects of climate change and climate processes? 
 The atmosphere and ocean exhibit coupled nonlinear chaotic variability that cascades to all 
time scales [91].  Variability is so large that the significance of recent decadal global temperature 
change (Fig. 7a) would be very limited, if the data were considered simply as a time series, 
without further information.  However, other knowledge includes information on the causes of 
some of the temperature variability, the planet’s energy imbalance, and global climate forcings. 
 The El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) [94] accounts for most low latitude temperature 
variability and much of the global variability.  The global impact of ENSO is coherent from 
month to month, as shown by the global-ocean-mean SST (Fig. 7b), for which the ocean’s 
thermal inertia minimizes the effect of weather noise.  The cool anomaly of 2008 coincides with 
an ENSO minimum and does not imply a change of decadal temperature trend. 
 Decadal time scale variability, such as predicted weakening of the Atlantic overturning 
circulation [95], could interrupt global warming, as discussed in section 18 of the Appendix.  But 
the impact of regional dynamical effects on global temperature is opposed by the planet’s energy 
imbalance [96], a product of the climate system’s thermal inertia, which is confirmed by 
increasing ocean heat storage [97].  This energy imbalance makes decadal interruption of global 
warming, in the absence of a negative climate forcing, improbable [96]. 
 Volcanoes and the sun can cause significant negative forcings.  However, even if the solar 
irradiance remained at its value in the current solar minimum, this reduced forcing would be 
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offset by increasing CO2 within seven years (Appendix section 18).  Human-made aerosols cause 
a greater negative forcing, both directly and through their effects on clouds.  The first satellite 
observations of aerosols and clouds with accuracy sufficient to quantify this forcing are planned 
to begin in 2009 [98], but most analysts anticipate that human-made aerosols will decrease in the 
future, rather than increase further. 
 Climate models have many deficiencies in their abilities to simulate climate change [2].  
However, model uncertainties cut both ways: it is at least as likely that models underestimate 
effects of human-made GHGs as overestimate them (Appendix section 18).  Model deficiencies 
in evaluating tipping points, the possibility that rapid changes can occur without additional 
climate forcing [63, 64], are of special concern.  Loss of Arctic sea ice, for example, has 
proceeded more rapidly than predicted by climate models [99].  There are reasons to expect that 
other nonlinear problems, such as ice sheet disintegration and extinction of interdependent 
species and ecosystems, also have the potential for rapid change [39, 63, 64]. 
 
5.  SUMMARY 
 
 Humanity today, collectively, must face the uncomfortable fact that industrial civilization 
itself has become the principal driver of global climate.  If we stay our present course, using 
fossil fuels to feed a growing appetite for energy-intensive life styles, we will soon leave the 
climate of the Holocene, the world of prior human history.  The eventual response to doubling 
pre-industrial atmospheric CO2 likely would be a nearly ice-free planet, preceded by a period of 
chaotic change with continually changing shorelines. 
 Humanity’s task of moderating human-caused global climate change is urgent.  Ocean and 
ice sheet inertias provide a buffer delaying full response by centuries, but there is a danger that 
human-made forcings could drive the climate system beyond tipping points such that change 
proceeds out of our control.  The time available to reduce the human-made forcing is uncertain, 
because models of the global system and critical components such as ice sheets are inadequate.  
However, climate response time is surely less than the atmospheric lifetime of the human-caused 
perturbation of CO2.  Thus remaining fossil fuel reserves should not be exploited without a plan 
for retrieval and disposal of resulting atmospheric CO2. 
 Paleoclimate evidence and ongoing global changes imply that today’s CO2, about 385 ppm, 
is already too high to maintain the climate to which humanity, wildlife, and the rest of the 
biosphere are adapted.  Realization that we must reduce the current CO2 amount has a bright 
side: effects that had begun to seem inevitable, including impacts of ocean acidification, loss of 
fresh water supplies, and shifting of climatic zones, may be averted by the necessity of finding an 
energy course beyond fossil fuels sooner than would otherwise have occurred. 
 We suggest an initial objective of reducing atmospheric CO2 to 350 ppm, with the target to 
be adjusted as scientific understanding and empirical evidence of climate effects accumulate.  
Although a case already could be made that the eventual target probably needs to be lower, the 
350 ppm target is sufficient to qualitatively change the discussion and drive fundamental changes 
in energy policy.  Limited opportunities for reduction of non-CO2 human-caused forcings are 
important to pursue but do not alter the initial 350 ppm CO2 target.  This target must be pursued 
on a timescale of decades, as paleoclimate and ongoing changes, and the ocean response time, 
suggest that it would be foolhardy to allow CO2 to stay in the dangerous zone for centuries. 
 A practical global strategy almost surely requires a rising global price on CO2 emissions and 
phase-out of coal use except for cases where the CO2 is captured and sequestered.  The carbon 
price should eliminate use of unconventional fossil fuels, unless, as is unlikely, the CO2 can be 
captured.  A reward system for improved agricultural and forestry practices that sequester carbon 
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could remove the current CO2 overshoot.  With simultaneous policies to reduce non-CO2 
greenhouse gases, it appears still feasible to avert catastrophic climate change. 
 Present policies, with continued construction of coal-fired power plants without CO2 capture, 
suggest that decision-makers do not appreciate the gravity of the situation.  We must begin to 
move now toward the era beyond fossil fuels.  Continued growth of greenhouse gas emissions, 
for just another decade, practically eliminates the possibility of near-term return of atmospheric 
composition beneath the tipping level for catastrophic effects. 
 The most difficult task, phase-out over the next 20-25 years of coal use that does not capture 
CO2, is Herculean, yet feasible when compared with the efforts that went into World War II.  
The stakes, for all life on the planet, surpass those of any previous crisis.  The greatest danger is 
continued ignorance and denial, which could make tragic consequences unavoidable. 
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